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This study aims at determining the impacts of economic policies on rice and welfare in Indonesia. 
It estimates a simultaneous equation model with two-stage least squares method, using secondary 
data from 1979 until 2008. The simulation of partial policy will be a trade-off for the producers and 
consumers of rice. The policy of the floor grain price is still needed to respond to the increased 
production of rice. The paper suggests that if the input subsidy is taken out, it should be preferably 
followed by the increase in output, and at least, the rising percentage should be in the same number 
so that the policy will be better off. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rice constitutes the staple food of Indone-
sian society. This makes rice as the most 
important food commodity in the national 
development. The importance of rice can 
be seen from two sides. First, as the staple 
food, rice should be available in sufficient 
quantity to meet the needs of the society. 
Second, it is as a source of income and em-
ployment for the majority of Indonesian 
people, especially for rural communities. 
In terms of availability, if the sup-
ply of rice is less, it can cause the rising 
prices and social insecurity. As the conse-
quence, the government should intervene in 
regulating and ensuring the availability of 
food for the society. It is very important 
because the great population potentially 
creates the national instability, if there is a 
lack of food. The rice plant is so familiar in 
the most parts of Indonesian region, and 
many people work on it as a source of in-
come. Besides, farming rice becomes the 
employment for the majority of rural la-
bors. Therefore, the effort to foster and de-
velop it is of paramount importance to in-
crease the income and to create employ-
ment for the society. 
Based on the significance of the rice 
mentioned above, the social role of gov-
ernment in creating stabilization is abso-
lutely needed. Government should pursue a 
variety of program development and pro-
duction improvement, adequate facilities 
and infrastructure which are sufficient for 
farmers, supporting price regulation, mar-
ket availability and organization for either 
farmers or government  that can support the 
operational activities of farmers. 
 The ssubsequent development 
shows that government intervention has so 
far not fully solved the problem of national 
rice. The domestic rice production contin-
ues to decrease, the price increases both on 
the rice and inputs used. Rice is sometimes 
nowhere to be found in the market and it 
causes prices to rise. Besides, there is often 
a surplus of grain at harvest which causes 
grain prices decreased, and it makes the 
farmers difficult to repay their loans. The 
problems above indicate that the market 
aspects require attention. Rice market con-
ditions will affect the perpetrators to take 
good decisions on production, consump-
tion, and demand for fertilizer, labor, and 
their income. Market changes will signifi-
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cantly change the reallocation of the perpe-
trators’ decisions. 
One of the indicators of success de-
velopment in the agricultural sector is that 
the achievement of national self-sufficiency 
in rice in 1984. The success rate is partly 
caused by the advances in technology, such 
as superior seed varieties, fertilizers, plant 
disease and pest control, irrigation devel-
opment, agricultural extension activities, 
provision of credit and it is also caused by 
the government intervention through vari-
ous policies of the rice industry in Indone-
sia. The government policies include the 
policy of input subsidies, the grain floor 
price policy, the highest selling price, 
which is supported by the system of pro-
curement, storage and domestic rice market 
operations or some type of buffer stock of 
government implemented through logistic 
agency. The policy is distortion of the free 
market mechanism (Sudaryanto, 2000), but 
it positively effects on production and 
farmer income (Simatupang, 2000) and the 
availability of rice with a relatively cheap 
price. 
In the last few years, rice produc-
tion has decreased. Many issues arise re-
garding the decline, and it can be seen from 
two sides, namely from the supply side and 
the demand one. The problems of the sup-
ply side include: Firstly, the rate of paddy 
production has been stagnant (leveling-off) 
due to the excess use of fertilizers. Second, 
there is lack of provision of investment 
funds for agri-food sectors namely credit, 
research, extension, maintenance, and in-
frastructure development that can encour-
age the increased food production. Third, 
the government reduces the input subsidies 
for the fertilizer and pesticide which are 
deemed to affect the decrease of produc-
tion. Fourth, there is the increased conver-
sion of fertile rice lands into industrial 
zones, housing, and non-agricultural land, 
particularly in Java. Fifth, there is the rising 
price of production factors due to the eco-
nomic and monetary crisis that hit Indone-
sia since 1997. And sixth, the natural dis-
turbance factor is drought, flood, and pest 
attack. Meanwhile, the problems of demand 
side include: Firstly, the population contin-
ues to grow, people's income increases so 
that the intensity of demand continues to 
rise. Second, the policy of cheap rice price 
causes food diversification program inef-
fective and the problems of imported rice. 
Problems and changes mentioned 
above will affect the implementation of 
various variables related to the supply and 
demand of in Indonesia in the future. 
Therefore, the developing phenomena on 
the domestic rice supply and demand, the 
impact of measures taken by both the mar-
ket and the welfare of producers and con-
sumers need to be studied continuously. 
This study generally aims to study and ana-
lyze the impacts of economic policies un-
dertaken by the government on the supply 
and demand of rice in Indonesia. Specifi-
cally the purposes of this paper are (1) To 
evaluate the impacts of economic policies 
on Indonesian rice supply and demand, and 
(2) To evaluate the impacts of economic 
policies to the changes of welfare in that of 
producer and consumer, as well as reve-
nue/expenditure of government. 
Economic welfare is a branch of 
economics that studies what should happen, 
and it is known as a normative approach. 
Economic welfare studies about how scarce 
resources should be allocated to achieve the 
maximum prosperity for individual eco-
nomic actors in a society as a whole. Eco-
nomic welfare is the foundation of eco-
nomic science branches, such as: economic 
resources, public finance, the analysis of 
benefit cost, and the economy of govern-
ment policies in many areas of science in-
cluding international trade, industry and 
welfare (Daryanto, 1989). 
Just et al. (1982) distinguishes wel-
fare economics into two parts, namely: old 
welfare economics and new welfare eco-
nomics. Some economic thinkers who be-
long to the old economic welfare are David 
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Ricardo, Alfred Marshall and Dupuit. 
Meanwhile, some economic thinkers who 
belong in the new welfare economics are 
Paul Samuelson, Vilfredo Pareto, Kaldor 
and Hicks, Scitovscky, Gormand, Lipsey 
and Lancaster, and John V. Krutilla. 
David Ricardo made the analysis on 
the welfare of society by introducing the 
concept of economic rent (1829) in discuss-
ing the effects of Corn Law in England. 
The concept of economic rent is using the 
approach of producer surplus and consumer 
surplus. Dupuit, a French scientist, used the 
notation of consumer surplus (1844) to ana-
lyze the effect of building bridge towards 
the welfare of society. Furthermore, Alfred 
Marshall created the more complete con-
cept of economic rent at the beginning of 
the 20th century and has since become the 
basis for important studies of economic 
welfare.  
Just et al. state that there are three 
basic principles used in the old welfare 
economics, namely: First, the social gains 
are maximized through competitive mar-
kets with interference in noncompetitive 
markets; Second, by using the technique of 
partial equilibrium analysis in recommend-
ing development policies. Partial equilib-
rium analysis sees the impact of welfare 
changes in one market by assuming that the 
effects in other markets give no effect, so 
that it can be ignored. And third, empiri-
cally, old economic welfare determines that 
the triangle-like area to the left of the de-
mand curve and above the price of money 
can be used as a measure of the consumer 
utility market, and that the triangle-like 
area left of the supply curve and below 
price is equal to the amount of money from 
the welfare of producers in the market. The 
changes in the region can be used to meas-
ure the changes of welfare in the commu-
nity. 
These three principles later get 
criticism from the economic thinkers who 
are later known as the new welfare eco-
nomics. Paul Samuelson at the beginning of 
1942 stated that the old welfare economics 
does not properly define the consumer sur-
plus. In general, the consumer surplus is 
not unique use of money measures of util-
ity, and uniqueness can give different im-
plications depending on the empirical data 
used. Vilfredo Pareto in 1896 stated that a 
number of policies that make someone 
worse do not match the expected goals. 
Then Vilfredo Pareto developed a theory 
known as Pareto optimal. 
Furthermore, Kaldor and Hicks 
(1939) state that the weight of each indi-
vidual's welfare is not necessarily the same. 
Besides, the change in consumer surplus 
and producer surplus among individuals is 
not sufficient as a basis for evaluating 
changes. Kaldor and Hicks introduced the 
concept of compensation principle; that 
changes should be done if there are poten-
tial gains, so as to create better conditions 
through the redistribution of output or in-
come in accordance with the changes. 
Hicks insisted on alternative measures of 
money from welfare. At the time of welfare 
is not directly related to the utility gains 
and losses, it can be interpreted with will-
ingness to pay. This concept is known as 
compensating variation and equivalent 
variation. 
The concept proposed by Kaldor 
and Hicks gets criticism from Scitovsky in 
1941, who claims that there is reversal 
paradox which illustrates the inconsistency 
of compensation principle in the analysis 
policy. Next Gorman in 1955 stated that 
there is the problem of intransitivity on the 
compensation principle; that is the incon-
sistent ranking of three or more situations. 
Further the criticism on the old wel-
fare economics comes from Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1956-1957) who state that the 
partial analysis approach in welfare eco-
nomics is not appropriate. By using the 
Pareto principle, they argue that the control 
of distortion of the single market or sector 
of the economy implies that the existence 
16 ECONOMIC JOURNAL OF EMERGING MARKETS   April 2010 2(1) 13-29 
of other sectors may make everyone 
equally good, or even better.  
In the midst of opposition thinking 
about the accuracy of the concept of eco-
nomic welfare, John V. Krutilla argued the 
thinking that can be said as a go-between. 
John V. Krutilla stated that the various al-
ternative range can be used, because, the 
result of the analysis is however deter-
mined by the value judgments rather than 




A model is an explanation of the actual 
phenomena as a system or process (Kout-
soyiannis, 1977). An econometric model is 
a special pattern of the algebraic model, 
namely an element that is stochastic which 
covers one or more confounding variables 
(Intriligator, 1978). 
Econometric model is a description 
of the relationship of each explanatory 
variables on the endogenous variables (de-
pendent variables), especially that which 
concerns with the sign and magnitude of 
the parameter estimator in accordance with 
a priori theoretical expectations. Good 
model must meet the criteria of economic 
theory (theoretically meaningful), the crite-
rion statistics viewed from a degree of ac-
curacy (goodness of fit), known as the co-
efficient of determination (R²) and statisti-
cally significant, while the criteria econo-
metric determines whether an estimate has 
the required properties such as unbiased-
ness, consistency, sufficiency, efficiency. 
Dw statistic is one of the statistical criteria 
used to test the econometric estimation, that 
is to test the validity of the assumption 
Autocorrelation (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). 
Specification model which is for-
mulated in this study is very relevant be-
cause the purpose of this study is to formu-
late a model of supply and demand of rice 
in Indonesia in the context of an open 
economy. The model is a simultaneous 
equation model. 
 
Response of Rice Harvest Area 
RLAPt = a0 + a1 HGTTt + a2 HJTPt  
  + a3 HFUt + a4 CHt + a5 KUTt   
  +a6 RLAPt-1 + U1.                (1) 
Hypothesis: a1, a4, a5 > 0; a2, a3 <0; a6<1.  
 
Response of Paddy Production 
YPPt  = b0 + b1 (HGTTt/HFUt) + b2 JPFUt 
  + b3 AIt + b4 GASIt + b5 DEt  
  + b6YPPt-1+U2.               (2) 
Hypothesis b1, b2, b3, b4, > 0; b5< 0  
and 0 < b6 < 1. 
 
Fertilizer Use 
JPFUt = c0 + c1HFUt + c2HGTTt  
  + c3RLAPt + c4DKt + c5JPFt-1 
  +U3. (3) 
Hypothesis: c1, c2, c3 > 0; c4 < 0; and 0 < c5 < 1 
 
Paddy Production and Rice Production 
PPINt  = RLAPt * YPPt. (4) 
PBINt  = PPINt * kt.  (5) 
 
The proportion of seed losses and runoff 
BSPLt  = PROt * PBINt. (6) 
 
Rice Stock at Year-End 
STBIt  = d0 + d1 HBERt + d2 PGSTt  
  + d3 PLSTt + d4 SKBRt  
  + d5 IBINt + d6 STBIt-1  
  + U4.  (7) 
Hypothesis: d2, d5 > 0; d1, d3, d4< 0;  
and 0 < d5 < 1.  
 
Indonesian Rice Import 
IBINt = e0 + e1 (HIINt*ERINAt)  
  + e2 PBINt + e3 STBIt-1  
  + e4 PDKINt + e5 GDPINt  
  + e6 TWt + e7 IBINt-1  
  + U5.  (8)  
 
Rice Import Price 
HIINt  = f0 + f1 HBWt + f2 TARIFt  
  + f3 HIINt-1 + U6. (9) 
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Hypothesis: e4, e5, f1, f2 > 0; e1, e2, e3, e6 <0, 
and 0 < e7, f3 < 0. 
 
Total of Indonesian Rice Offer 
QSBIt  = PBINt – BSPLt + STBIt-1  
  + IBINt – EXSPORt .  (10) 
 
Rice Domestic Demand 
DBINt  = g0 + g1HBERt + g2HJTPt  
  + g3PDKINt + g4 GDPINt-1 
  + g5 DBINt-1 + U7.   (11) 
Hypothesis: g1, g4 < 0; g2, g3>0;  
and 0 < g5 < 1. 
 
Indonesian Rice Export 
Export = PBINt – BSPLt + STBIt-1 + IBINt – 
DBINt -STBIt. (12) 
 
Procurement of Rice Stock 
PGSTt  = h0 + h1 (HGTTt/HDGt)  
  + h2TAPBt + h3 PBINt + h4 INFt  
  + h5 TWt + h6 PGSTt-1 + U8  (13) 
Hypothesis: h1, h4, h5 < 0; h2, h3 > 0;  
and 0 < h6 < 1. 
 
Disposal of Rice Stock: 
PLSTt  = i0 + i1 (DBINt/PBINt)  
  + i2 STBIt-1 + i3 PGSTt + i4 IBINt  
  + i5 INFt + i6 TWt + i7 PLSTt-1  
  + U9.  (14) 
Hypothesis: i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 > 0; and 0 < i7 < 1. 
 
Indonesian Rice Marketing Margin 
MPBIt = HBERt – HGTTt/Kt. (15) 
 
Retailing Rice Price 
HBERt = j0 + j1 (HIINt * ERINAt)  
 + j2 HGTTt + j3 PBINt + j4 TWt  
 + j5 HBERt-1 + U10. (16) 
Hypothesis: j1, j2, j4 > 0; j3 < 0; and 0 < j5 < 1. 
 
Grain Price on Farmer Level  
HGTTt = k0 + k1 (HIINt * ERINAt)  
  + k2 HDGt + k3 MPBIt  
  + k4 PPINt + k5 TWt  
  + k6 HGTTt-1 + U11. (17) 
Hypothesis: k1, k2, k5 > 0; k3, k4,<0; and    
0< k6<1. 
Farm Income of Indonesian Farmer 
PUPPt = (HGTTt*PPINt)-(HFUt*JPFUt) 
  -(JPPSt*HPSt)-BPLNt. (18) 
 
Variable Details: 
RLAPt is  response of rice harvest area 
(1000 ha). 
HGTTt is grain price in the farmer lever 
(Rp/Kg), deflated with index of whole-
saler’s price in Indonesia in the basic year 
(1995is100). 
HJTPt  is  corn price (Rp/Kg), deflated 
with index of wholesaler’s price in Indone-
sia in the basic year (1995is100).  
HFUt  is  urea fertilizer price (Rp/Kg), de-
flated with index of consumer’s price in 
Indonesia. 
CHt  is  rainfall (mm/year). 
KUTt is  farm credit (Rp.million), deflated 
with index of wholesaler’s price in Indone-
sia. 
RLAPt-1 is  timing differences lag of har-
vest area response. 
Ut  is confounding variables. 
YPPt is paddy productivity (ton/ha). 
JPFUt is  the number of fertilizer use 
(kg/ha). 
AIt  is  intensification area (1000 ha). 
GASIt is irrigation area (1000 ha). 
DEt  is  dummy El-nino, Value 1is occur-
ring symptom El-nino and 0 is no occurring 
symptom El-nino. 
YPPt-1 is  year paddy productivity last year 
JPFUt is  the number of fertilizer use 
(kg/ha). 
DKt  is  dummy crisis economy, value 1 is 
economic crisis is and value 0 is no eco-
nomic crisis. 
JPFt-1 is  the number of fertilizer use last 
year (kg/ha). 
PPINt  is paddy productivity in Indonesia 
(1000 ton). 
PBINt  is rice productivity in Indonesia 
(1000 ton). 
Kt  is score conversion 0.63.  
BSPLt  is  the amount of rice for seed, 
other uses/losses (1000 ton) 
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PROt  is the proportion of rice for seed, 
other uses/losses (%). 
STBIt is  the number of national rice stocks 
at the end of the year in Logistic Agency 
(1000 ton). 
HBERt is  retail price of rice (Rp/kg), de-
flated with index of wholesaler’s price in 
Indonesia (1995is100). 
PGSTt is  total procurement of paddy/rice 
(1000 ton). 
PLSTt is total release/distribution of 
grain/rice (1000 ton). 
SKBRt is  real lending rate in Logistic 
Agency (%), that is the nominal interest 
rate minus the rate of general inflation. 
IBINt is the number of Indonesian rice im-
port (1000 ton).  
STBIt-1 is the number of national rice stocks 
last year (1000 ton). 
IBINt is the number of Indonesian rice im-
port (1000 ton). 
HIINt is Indonesia rice import price 
(US$/Kg), deflated with index of whole-
saler’s price in Indonesia. 
TARIFt is Indonesian rice import tariff 
(Rp/kg). 
ERINAt is the rupiah exchange rate against 
U.S. dollar (Rp/US$), deflated with index 
of Indonesia consumer’s price. 
PDKINt is  the number of Indonesian peo-
ple (Million people). 
GDPINt is  per capita income of Indone-
sia's population (Rp million). 
TWt  is the tendency of the time or the time 
trend.  
HBWt is  world rice price (US$/ton) namely 
25 percent rice price quality broken in 
Bangkok Free on Board, deflated by 
wholesaler’s price index of the United 
States with a base year (1995is100). 
IBINt-1 is the number of Indonesia's rice 
import last year. 
HIINt-1 is import price of rice last year. 
QSBIt  is the total supply of Indonesian rice 
(1000 ton). 
EKSPORt is total export of Indonesian rice 
(1000 ton). 
DBINt is total consumption of rice for food 
(1000 ton). 
HDGt is floor Price of grain (Rp/kg), de-
flated by wholesaler’s price index in Indo-
nesia. 
TAPBt is  the total procurement budget of 
grain/rice (Rp million). 
INFt  is the rate of general inflation (%). 
PGSTt-1 is the rocurement of paddy/rice last 
year. 
PLSTt-1 is disposal/distribution of rice 
stocks last year. 
HBERt-1 is retail prices of rice last year. 
HGTTt-1 is the price of grain at farmer level 
last yeark 
PUPPt is Indonesian Farmer’s Income (Rp 
1000)k 
JPPSt  is total of pesticide use (liter/ha)k. 
HPSt  is  rice toxic pesticides (Rp/liter)k. 




Model iidentification is determined on the 
basis of "order condition" as a condition of 
necessity and the "rank condition" as a 
condition of adequacy. According to Kout-
soyiannis (1977), the formulation of struc-
tural equation model identification based 
on order condition is determined by: 
 
(K - M) > (G  - 1).  (19) 
 
where K is total variables in the model, 
namely endogenous variables and prede-
termined variables, M is the number of en-
dogenous and exogenous variables which 
are included in a particular equation in the 
model, and G is otal equations in the 
model, namely the number of endogenous 
variables in the model.   
If in an equation in the model indi-
cates the following conditions: 
(K–M ) > (G–1) is the equation is stated 
over identified. 
(K–M) is (G–1) is the equation is stated 
exactly identified. 
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(K–M) < (G–1) is the equation is stated 
unidentified. 
 
The result of identification for each 
structural equation must exactly be identi-
fied or over identified  to be able to suspect 
its parameters. In this paper, a model that 
has been formulated comprising of 11 
structural equations and 7 structural identi-
ties (18 endogenous variables (G), and 42 
predetermined variables consisting of 31 
exogenous variables and 11 lag endogenous 
variables Therefore, the total variables in 
the model (K) is 60 variables, the number 
of variables in the equation (M) is 7 vari-
ables. Therefore, based on the criteria of 
order condition, any structural similarities 
that exist in the model is over-Identified. 
 
Model Estimation Method  
Model estimation method uses two stages 
least squares (2SLS) and data processing is 
done by using software SAS / ETS v. 9. 
To determine whether the model is 
valid enough to create a simulation of al-
ternative policy or non policy and forecast-
ing, it is necessary to do a validation 
model, with the aim to analyze how far the 
model can represent the real world. In this 
study, the statistic criterion for the valida-
tion of the estimating value of econometric 
model used is: Root Means Square Error 
(RMSE), (Root Means Percent Square Error 
(RMSPE) and Theil's Inequality Coefficient 
(U) (Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1991). The 
















































































tY is value of the basic simulation results 
of the observation variable, 
a
tY is the actual value of the observation 
variable,  
n is total observation period. 
 
Model Simulation 
Policy analysis is carried out to see the im-
pact of economic policies on all endoge-
nous variables. Thus we can find out how 
the endogenous variables react to the 
changes in exogenous variables. Some 
simulations of alternative scenarios of eco-
nomic policy are as follows: 1) Raise the 
floor price of grain 20 percent; 2) Elimina-
tion of urea fertilizer subsidies so that its 
price increases 20 percents; 3) Raise the 30 
percent tariff on rice imports; 4) Simulation 
combination 1 and 2. 
 
Welfare Changes 
In this study alternative policy simulation is 
also used to calculate and analyze the 
changes in the welfare of society. The indi-
cators which are used as a change from the 
public welfare are producer’s surplus, con-
sumer’s surplus and government’s revenue. 
The Indicator of welfare changes will be 
used as a basic evaluation and a determin-
ing policy direction that will be taken. 
Analysis of changes in welfare can be for-
mulated as follows: 
 
Changes in Producer Surplus Rice 
PPINB (HGTTS – HGTTB) + ½ (PPINS 
– PPINB) (HGTTS – HGTTB). (23) 
 
Changes in Producer’s Surplus Rice 
PBINB (HBERS – HBERB) + ½ (PBINS 
– PBINB) (HBERS – HBERB). (24) 
 
Changes in Consumer’s Surplus Rice 
DBINB (HBERB–HBERS) + ½ (DBINS – 
DBINB) (HBERS – HEBRB). (25) 
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Government Revenue 
(IBINS * HIINS) - (IBINB * HIINB) (26) 
Net Surplus is (1 + 2 + 3 +4). 
 
Types and Sources of Data 
Data used in this paper are secondary data 
with the time series from 1979 up to 2008. 
Sources of data are BPS, Logistic Agency, 
Sitepu (2002) and related institutions. 
 
RESULTS DISCUSSION 
Uncertainty of Estimation Results and 
Elasticity 
As described before, the model formulated 
is linear simultaneous equations model, 
with two-stage estimation methods least 
squares method (2SLS). The result of be-
havioral prediction equation (structural be-
havior) which is based on the sign and 
magnitude, the coefficient of determination 
(R ²), t and F statistics can be seen in Table 
1 untill Table 11. The result of the eco-
nomic prediction of rice in this study is 
quite well as seen from the value of deter-
mination coefficient (R²) of each equation 
behavior ranging from 0:55 to 0.99. This 
shows that in general the explanatory vari-
ables (exogenous variables) that exist in the 
equation can explain well the behavior of 
endogenous variables.  
 
 













INTERCEP 50.089452 96.490238 0.519 0.6089 Intercept     
HGTTR 0.024581 0.136168 0.181 0.8584 Grain price 0.009 0.131 
HJTPR -0.048319 0.106887 -0.452 0.6557 Corn price  -0.018 -0.260 
HFUR -0.141955 0.102728 -1.382 0.1809 Real fertilizer price -0.048 -0.692 
CH 0.036432 0.017091 2.132 0.0444 Rainfall 0.086 1.234 
KUTR 0.000615 0.001937 0.318 0.7537 Credit UT 0.001 0.012 
LRLAP 0.930480 0.076822 12.112 0.0001 RLAP t-1     
R2 is 0.9407  
Prob>F is 0.0001     
Source: Data estimation. 
 
 













INTERCEP 0.355489 0.332086 1.07 0.296 Intercept     
INA3 0.058361 0.063912 0.913 0.3711 HGTTR/HFUR 0.02 0.05 
JPFU 0.001217 0.001149 1.059 0.3011 Tot. use of urea fertilizer 0.05 0.13 
AI 0.000078 0.000036 2.158 0.0421 Intensification area 0.18 0.46 
GASI 0.000052 0.00012 0.44 0.6643  irrigation area 0.06 0.16 
DE -0.133658 0.050796 -2.631 0.0153 dummy el-nino 0.00 -0.01 
LYPP 0.615094 0.118109 5.208 0.0001 Productivity t-1     
R2 is 0.9927 
Prob>F is 0.0001     
Source: Data estimation. 
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INTERCEP -33.88015 35.2699 -0.961 0.3467 Intercept     
HFUR -0.073123 0.03500 -2.089 0.048 Real Fertilizer Price -0.16 - 0.42 
HGTTR 0.040323 0.03991 1.01 0.3228 Grain price 0.10 0.25 
RLAP 0.106768 0.06039 1.768 0.0904 Harvest Area Response 0.69 1.81 
DK -8.873013 9.89527 -0.897 0.3792 dummy crisis -0.01 -0.02 
LJPFU 0.620596 0.17177 3.613 0.0015 Fertilizer use t-1 n.a. n.a. 
R2 is 0.9157 
Prob>F is 0.0001 
    
Source: Data estimation. 
 














INTERCEP 1778.768 732.76030 2.427 0.0238 Intercept     
HBERR -2.213264 0.736311 -3.006 0.0065 Rice grain -1.26 -1.88 
PGST 0.63348 0.164051 3.861 0.0008 stock procure. DL 0.60 0.89 
PLST -0.110925 0.134652 -0.824 0.4189 total release of stock -0.18 -0.27 
SKBR -33.47144 10.84742 -3.086 0.0054 interest rate 0.08 0.12 
IBIN 0.23648 0.124239 1.903 0.0702 Rice Import 0.18 0.27 
LSTBI 0.328215 0.188844 1.738 0.0962 Rice stock a t-1     
R2 is 0.6953 
Prob>F is 0.0001    
Source: Data estimation. 
 













INTERCEP 939514.0 637960 1.473 0.1557 Intercept     
INA6 -0.000074 0.000042 -1.729 0.0985 (HIINR*ERINAR) -0.27 -0.35 
PBIN -2.599275 1.842848 -1.41 0.173 Ina. Rice Production -5.66 -7.26 
LSTBI -0.743686 0.295149 -2.52 0.0199 Rice Stock at t-1 -0.95 -1.22 
PDKIN 211.78005 111.85948 1.893 0.0722 Population size 32.43 41.59 
GDPIN 0.001942 0.001513 1.284 0.2133 Income population 0.62 0.80 
TW -486.9963 329.6805 -1.477 0.1545 Time trend     
LIBIN 0.220137 0.210041 1.048 0.3065 Ina. rice Import t-1     
R2 is 0.5587 
Prob>F is 0.0001    
Source: Data estimation. 
 













INTERCEP -361.86913 156.359097 -2.314 0.0292 Intercept     
HBW 1.532546 0.426108 3.597 0.0014 World Rice Price 0.494 1.694 
TARIFR 0.076876 0.541087 0.142 0.8882 Import Tariff 0.002 0.007 
LHIINR 0.708579 0.053748 13.183 0.0001 Ina Import Price t-1     
R2 is 0.9322 
Prob>F is 0.0001     
Source: Data estimation. 
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The value of F test statistics is gen-
erally high, that is ranging from 3.79 to 
496.21, which means that the variation of 
the explanatory variables in each equation 
behavior is jointly able to explain well the 
endogenous variation at the level α is 
0.0001 and 0.0081. Besides, every struc-
tural equation has parameter magnitude and 
its sign is in line with the expectations and 
quite logical from the standpoint of eco-
nomic theory. 
 













INTERCEP -8594.4655 4753.0847 -1.808 0.0837 Intercept     
HBERR -4.170644 1.792611 -2.327 0.0292 Rice price  -0.15 -0.17 
HJTPR 1.163571 1.902793 0.612 0.5469 Corn price 0.02 0.02 
PDKIN 190.070939 61.410502 3.095 0.0051 Population size 1.41 1.64 
GDPIN -0.002184 0.001307 -1.671 0.1082 Population income -0.03 -0.04 
LDBIN 0.141459 0.247755 0.571 0.5736 Rice Demand t-1     
R2 is 0.9868 
Prob>F is 0.0001.     
Source: Data estimation. 
 













INTERCEP 546557 160120 3.413 0.0025 Intercept     
INA2 -655.3044 475.9429 -1.377 0.1824 HGTTR/HDGRR -0.45 -0.47 
TAPB 0.523702 0.172884 3.029 0.0062 Total budget of 
Logistic Agency 
0.46 0.47 
PBIN 3.157749 0.86783 3.639 0.0014 Ina rice production 5.61 5.82 
INF -41.176711 9.203728 -4.474 0.0002 Gen. inflation rate -0.43 -0.45 
TW -278.04333 81.61393 -3.407 0.0025 Time trend     
LPGST 0.036084 0.143305 0.252 0.8035 Stock procure. t-1     
R2 is 0.7431 
Prob>F is 0.0001. 
   
Source: Data estimation. 
 













INTERCEP -132353 39768 -3.328 0.0032 Intercept     
INA4 701.20767 290.7829 2.411 0.0251 DBIN/PBIN 2.90 3.32 
LSTBI 0.453809 0.148081 3.065 0.0059 Rice stock at t-1 0.27 0.31 
PGST 0.475395 0.244386 1.945 0.0653 Stock procure. DL 0.27 0.31 
IBIN 0.393767 0.115451 3.411 0.0026 Total Ina rice import 0.18 0.21 
INF 36.506429 7.58637 4.812 0.0001 Gen. inflation rate 0.22 0.25 
TW 63.151344 19.069856 3.312 0.0033 Time trend     
LPLST 0.126569 0.161397 0.784 0.4417 Stock release t-1     
R2 is 0.8654 
Prob>F is 0.0001    
Source: Data estimation. 
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INTERCEP -40978 21600 -1.897 0.0704 Intercept     
INA6 0.0000023 0.000005 0.501 0.6213 (HIINR*ERINAR) 0.01 0.02 
HGTTR 0.710195 0.247242 2.872 0.0086 Grain price 0.32 0.43 
PBIN -0.287901 0.145236 -1.982 0.0595 Ina rice production -0.85 -1.14 
TW 21.143433 11.086874 1.907 0.0691 Time trend      
LHBERR 0.254717 0.164482 1.549 0.1351 Rice price t-1     
R2 is 0.7466 
Prob>F is 0.0001.     
Source: Data estimation. 
 













INTERCEP 7318.155 13291 -0.551 0.5875 Intercept     
INA6 0.000008 0.000002 3.795 0.0010 (HIINR*ERINAR) 0.09 0.10 
HDGRR 0.573998 0.165934 3.459 0.0022 Grain Floor Price 0.63 0.73 
MPBI -0.332379 0.095926 -3.465 0.0022 Rice Market Margin -0.20 -0.24 
PPIN -0.016387 0.057243 -0.286 0.7774 Ina Rice Production -0.17 -0.20 
TW 3.780092 6.825185 0.554 0.5853 Time Trend      
LHGTTR 0.141744 0.119135 1.19 0.2468 Grain price t-1     
R2 is 0.7752 
Prob>F is 0.0001     
Source: Data estimation. 
 
The tstatistic value is used to test whether 
each of the explanatory variables gives sig-
nificant effects to the endogenous variables 
which are not significant or giving no sig-
nificant effect to the endogenous variables 
for the level α is 0.05.  
From the results of model prediction 
models, we then calculate the short-term elas-
ticity (SR) and long term (LR) of endogenous 
variables to each its endogenous variable. Of 
the eleven endogenous variables which are 
analyzed, it is obtained several endogenous 
variables that respond elastically to the ex-
ogenous variables as shown above. 
 
Model Variation 
Simulation policy is aimed at analyzing the 
impact of various alternative policies by 
changing the value of its policy variables. 
However, before doing the policy of alter-
native simulation, it needs to accomplish 
the model validation to see whether the al-
legation is in accordance with the actual 
value of each endogenous variable 
(Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1991). In this 
study, a basic simulation for the observa-
tion of sample period 1979-2008 has been 
tested. The validation of statistical indicator 
used is the Percent Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSPE) to measure how close the value 
of each endogenous variable estimation re-
sults following the actual data value during 
the period of observation or in other words 
how much the deviation in percent is. 
Besides, the statistic of bias propor-
tion (UM), the regressive proportion  (UR), 
the distributive proportion (UD) and also 
Theil's statistical inequality coefficient (U) 
are used to evaluate the ability of the model 
for the analysis of historical and ex-ante 
simulation. Basically, if the values of 
RMSE, RMSPE and U-Theil's are smaller 
and the value of R² is greater, the prediction 
model will be better. Theil’s coefficient 
value (U) ranges between 1 and 0. If U is 0, 
the model prediction is perfect, and if U is 
1, the model prediction is naive. 
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1 PPIN 4.4939 0.2160 0.0320 0.7520 0.0130 0.7710 0.0240 
2 PBIN 4.4939 0.2160 0.0320 0.7520 0.0130 0.7710 0.0240 
3 BSPL 4.4939 0.2160 0.0320 0.7520 0.0130 0.7710 0.0240 
4 QSBI 3.5098 0.0490 0.0000 0.9510 0.0070 0.9440 0.0171 
5 PUPP 10.9340 0.0910 0.0050 0.9040 0.0500 0.8590 0.1044 
6 MPBI 66.6072 0.0710 0.1400 0.7900 0.0340 0.8950 0.2001 
7 EKSPOR 4.6042 0.1270 0.0010 0.8710 0.0020 0.8700 0.0228 
8 RLAP 4.2002 0.1150 0.0080 0.8780 0.0060 0.8800 0.0212 
9 YPP 2.4957 0.0990 0.0260 0.8750 0.0100 0.8900 0.0121 
10 JPFU 12.7496 0.1550 0.0610 0.7840 0.0050 0.8400 0.0518 
11 STBI 66.5252 0.0410 0.0240 0.9350 0.0810 0.8770 0.1666 
12 IBIN 58.7913 0.0750 0.0400 0.8850 0.0130 0.9120 0.2003 
13 HIINR 33.7960 0.0000 0.0140 0.9860 0.0640 0.9360 0.0996 
14 DBIN 2.9880 0.0130 0.0010 0.9860 0.0020 0.9850 0.0149 
15 PGST 61.3733 0.0880 0.1000 0.8120 0.0000 0.9110 0.1736 
16 PLST 27.7640 0.0710 0.0830 0.8460 0.0010 0.9280 0.1059 
17 HBERR 9.3033 0.0340 0.0040 0.9630 0.0510 0.9150 0.0487 
18 HGTTR 26.1549 0.0290 0.0130 0.9580 0.1850 0.7860 0.0666 
Source: Data estimation. 
 
From Table 12, it can be known that 
four equations in the model have greater 
RMSPE values than 50 percents; the rests 
have RMSPE value of fewer than 50 per-
cents. Based on of U-Theil's statistic value, 
it is found that all the equations have less 
U-Theil’s values than 0:20, and it shows 
that valid is carried out to perform policy 
simulations whether at the historical or 
forecast periods. 
 
The Impact of Economic Policies on Rice 
Supply and Demand 
There are four policies analyzed in this pa-
per, they are the increasing of floor price by 
20 percent, the elimination of fertilizer sub-
sidy so that the price of urea fertilizer is 
increased by 20 percent, and the policy of 
increasing import tariffs by 30 percent, and 
the combination of policies of the increas-
ing of grain floor price and the elimination 
of fertilizer subsidy respectively increases 
by 20 percent. The result of policy analysis 
can be seen in Table 13. 
As seen in Table 13, if the policy 
simulation to raise the floor price of grain 
by 20 percent is done, it will have positive 
impact on the increasing of paddy produc-
tion by 3.97 percents and the income of 
farmers by 38.79 percents. The increasing 
of the floor price of the grain will cause the 
prices of grain and rice to increase by 22.82 
percents and 5:55 percents respectively. 
This will impact on the demand for rice, 
which is reflected by the decline in demand 
for rice by 0.94 percents. 
The case will be different if the re-
duction policy of fertilizer subsidies or in-
creasing the price of urea fertilizer by 20 
percents is made, it will affect on the de-
crease of the rice production and farmer’s 
income by 13.20 percents and 35.40 per-
cents. The decrease of this production will 
also reduce the supply of rice by 13.21 per-
cents, therefore in order to meet domestic 
demand, it is required the additional rice 
import by 209.73 percents. The elimination 
of fertilizer subsidy will also cause the 
price of rice increased by 9.52 percents so 
that the demand for rice will decrease by 
1.60 percents. 
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1 2 3 4 
Paddy production 000 ton 3856.00 3.97 -13.20 0.000 -9.75 
Rice production 000 ton 2430.00 3.95 -13.21 -0.041 -9.79 
Seed proportion/decreasing 000 ton 242.95 3.96 -13.20 -0.001 -9.76 
Total of rice offer 000 ton 24154.00 -0.63 -4.35 0.000 -4.95 
Farmer’s income  Rp. billion 1.03 38.79 -35.40 0.039 -3.41 
Rice market margin Rp/Kg 195.26 -47.19 78.71 -0.014 34.64 
Indonesian rice export 000 Ton -19668.00 0.37 -9.02 0.000 -8.92 
Harvest area response 000 Ha 1006.00 1.79 -8.85 0.000 -7.14 
Productivity  Ton/Ha 3.75 2.07 -4.37 -0.003 -2.52 
Total of fertilizer use Kg/Ha 160.78 8.09 -24.75 -0.001 -16.83 
Rice stock at year-end 000 ton 1533.00 3.91 -44.93 0.000 -39.54 
Total of rice import 000 ton 792.63 -46.47 209.73 -0.035 111.57 
Rice import price US/ton 1145.00 0.00 0.00 0.087 0.00 
Rice demand    000 ton 22621.00 -0.94 -1.60 0.000 -2.60 
Stock procurement DL 000 ton 1503.00 19.89 -63.95 0.000 -47.58 
Total of stock release 000 ton 2205.00 -14.69 38.00 0.000 22.63 
Rice price Rp/Kg 791.44 5.55 9.52 0.009 15.45 
Grain price Rp/Kg 375.59 22.82 13.14 0.016 9.17 
Source: Data estimation. 
 
 
The above table should be understood with 
the following notes. Simulation 1 is the in-
creasing of floor price of grain by 20 per-
cents. Simulation 2 is the elimination of 
fertilizer subsidies (urea fertilizer increasing) 
by 20 percents. Simulation 3 is the increas-
ing of import tariffs by 30 percents. Simu-
lation 4 is the policy combination to raise 
the floor price of grain and the elimination 
of fertilizer subsidy by 20 percents. 
In terms of trade, the policy of in-
creasing the import tariff 30 percents from 
the average import tariff that has already 
been set will not affect on Indonesian rice 
production so that the total supply will also 
remain unchanged. This shows that the pol-
icy of the import tariff is not effective to 
increase the rice production. The policy to 
increase the import tariff on the rice import 
will cause prices to increase by 0.09 per-
cents that is followed by a decrease in the 
amount of rice import by 0.04 percents. 
The increase in import prices causes the 
prices of grain and rice to increase respec-
tively 12.02 percents and 0.01 percents. 
The small percentage of increasing the rice 
price does not affect the demand for rice in 
Indonesia. 
To protect producers and consum-
ers, government often performs a combina-
tion of alternative policies such as raising 
the floor price of rice and urea fertilizer 
subsidy reduction. The alternative combi-
nations of the policy give negative effects 
to the rice production by 9.79 percents. The 
decrease of this production will also reduce 
the supply of rice by 4.95 percents, so that 
to meet the domestic demand the additional 
rice import by 111.57 percents is required. 
Meanwhile, the combination of the policies 
causes the prices of paddy and rice to in-
crease respectively by 9.17 and 15:45 per-
cents. This causes the demand for rice to 
drop by 2.60 percents. 
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The Evaluation of Economic Policy on Public Welfare 
Table 14: The Impact of Alternative Policies on Indicator Changes of Society Economic 
Welfare 
Welfare Indicator Item 
Alternative Policy 
1 2 3 4 
Surplus of Paddy Producer Rp Billion 337.13 -177.70 0.23 126.31 
Surplus of Rice Producer Rp Billion 108.88 171.06 0.17 282.62 
Surplus of Rice Consumer Rp Billion -998.58 -1718.73 -1.57 -2802.38 
Government Revenue Rp Billion -421.71 1903.41 0.47 1012.60 
Net Surplus Rp Billion -974.28 178.05 -0.70 -1380.86 
Source: Data estimation. 
 
The calculation results of the impact 
of the alternative policies on economic wel-
fare by using indicators of producer sur-
plus, consumer surplus, and government 
revenues are presented in Table 14. 
From Table 14 it can be seen that 
the increase in the floor price of rice by 20 
percents gives a positive impact to the ac-
quirement of the surplus of rice and paddy 
producers respectively by Rp 337.13 billion 
and Rp 108.88 billion. Instead, the policy 
gives a negative impact to the consumers 
by Rp 998.58 billion. Thus it can be said 
that the policy to raise the floor price of 
grain to the producers of paddy will create 
economic disparities. In applying the policy 
to raise the floor price of rice the govern-
ment should issue a big enough budget, and 
this is indicated by negative government 
revenue by Rp 421.71 billion. An alterna-
tive policy is causing net surplus to be 
negative (- USD 974.28 billion). This indi-
cates that the policy to raise the floor price 
of grain inefficient. 
On the contrary, the elimination of 
by raising the price of fertilizer by 20 per-
cents gives a negative impact to the acqui-
sition of the surplus of rice producer and 
rice consumer respectively by Rp 177.70 
billion and USD 1718.73 billion. On the 
other hand, a positive impact on producers 
of rice by Rp 171.06 billion is closely re-
lated to rice marketing margins. The pro-
ducer of rice in general is a trader who re-
ceives the marketing margin greater than 
the marketing margin of the paddy and rice 
producers. Urea fertilizer is one of the ma-
jor inputs in producing rice so that the de-
crease in the number of farmers who use 
urea fertilizer will directly impact the pro-
duction decrease. Consequently, the rice 
farmer’s revenue declines. Another impli-
cation is the price of rice will increase so 
that the acquisition of consumer surplus 
decreases. The application of the removal 
policy of the urea fertilizer will directly 
imply on the government revenue with the 
acquisition of revenue by USD 1903.41 
billion. Overall, the net surplus is positive 
and it shows that the application of the pol-
icy is efficient. 
In the international trade, the policy 
of import tariffs by 30 percents gives a 
positive impact to the acquisition of the 
paddy and rice producer’s surplus and 
gives a negative impact to the acquisition 
of consumer’s surplus. The policy to raise 
the import tariffs by 30 percents brings 
about surplus to the producer of paddy and 
rice respectively by Rp 12.23 billions and 
billions 0.17, while the acquisition of the 
consumer’s surplus decreases by USD 1:57 
billion. The application of the policy to 
raise the import tariffs by 30 percents gives 
a positive effect to the government revenue 
by Rp 12.47 billions. Furthermore, the net 
surplus of the application of policy to raise 
the import tariff is negative (USD 0.70 bil-
lion). It also happens to the application of 
policy to raise the floor price of grain. 
Therefore it can be inferred that the policy 
of increasing the import tariff is inefficient. 
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The alternative combination of the 
subsidy reduction policy and increasing the 
floor price of rice has the same implication 
with the application of the import tariff pol-
icy from the aspects of welfare indicators 
which are analyzed, but with a different 
scale. The combination of these policies 
brings a positive impact on the acquisition 
of the paddy and rice producer’s surplus 
but it brings a negative impact for the ac-
quisition of consumer’s surplus. In addi-
tion, the combination of these policies has 
positive impact on the government revenue, 
but generates a negative net surplus. Thus it 
can be said that the combination of policies 
to raise the floor price of grain by 20 per-
cents and remove the subsidy of urea fertil-
izer by raising its price by 20 percent will 
cause bias to the producers of paddy and 
rice. And the value of a negative net sur-
plus shows that the application of this com-
bination is economically inefficient. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the research that has been carried out 
on the impact of economic policies and 
trade liberalization on the supply and de-
mand of rice in Indonesia, it can be con-
cluded as follows. First, harvest area is af-
fected by the price of grain on the price of 
grain on the farmer level, the price of urea 
fertilizer, rainfall, the price of corn on the 
level of farmer and farm credit, but the re-
sponse is inelastic. This shows that the area 
of paddy field has reached the maximum 
limit (closing cultivation frontier). 
Second, paddy productivity is af-
fected by the price of grain, the price of 
urea fertilizer, the total of fertilizer use, ir-
rigated acreage, the area of intensification, 
and the symptoms of global warming (El 
Nino), but the response is inelastic. This 
shows that the productivity of paddy has 
encountered a problem stagnant production 
(leveling-off) as a result of the use of im-
balanced fertilizer.  
Third, the response of grain/rice 
production which is supposed from the in-
creasing of acreage and productivity is not 
responsive to the price. This indicates that 
the price is not the main orientation for 
farmers to increase their production but it is 
mainly due to the consumption needs.  
Fourth, the demand of rice for con-
sumption is significantly influenced by the 
changes in the retail prices of rice, but the 
response is inelastic. It means that the 
changes in the price of rice brings only a 
small impact on the changes in demand for 
rice, and on the price of corn, the response 
on the rice demand is also inelastic. The 
other factor that affects the demand for the 
consumption of rice is the large number of 
Indonesian populations. The response to 
the changes in the amount of rice demand 
is inelastic in the short-term residents, and 
elastic in the long term.  
Fifth, the factors that influence the 
number of Indonesia's rice imports are In-
donesia's rice import price, exchange rate, 
early rice stocks, population, and income 
per capita of the population. The response 
of rice imports to the total demand for do-
mestic rice production and population of 
Indonesia is elastic. Indonesia's rice import 
price itself is influenced by world price of 
rice and import tariffs.  
Sixth, the increase of the floor price 
of grain by 20 percents brings a positive 
impact on the rice production and farmer’s 
income. It also makes the price of rice rise, 
but it brings impact on the decline in de-
mand for rice. This policy increases the 
welfare of the paddy and rice producers, 
while consumer’s welfare decreases, and 
the government should issue a big enough 
budget to implement the policy. Overall, 
this policy is economically inefficient.  
Seventh, the policy to increase the 
price of fertilizer by 20 percents affects on 
the decrease of the paddy production and 
farmer’s income. This policy causes the 
price of rise to rise so that the demand for 
rice decreases. This policy causes the wel-
fare of paddy producer and consumer to 
decrease, whereas the welfare of the rice 
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producer increases. The removal of urea 
fertilizer subsidy will reduce the govern-
ment spending. Overall the implementation 
of this policy is economically efficient.  
Eigth, the increasing of the import 
tariffs by 30 percents has no impact on the 
total supply of rice, but it only increases the 
price of paddy and rice in a low percentage. 
This policy increases the welfare of the 
paddy and rice producers, but the welfare 
of the rice consumer welfare decreases. 
Government obtains additional revenue by 
implementing this policy. Overall the pol-
icy is economically inefficient.  
Ninth, the combination of the poli-
cies on the floor price of grain and the 
elimination of urea fertilizer subsidies has a 
negative impact on the production and de-
mand of rice. The combination of these 
policies will improve the welfare of the 
paddy and rice producers, but the welfare 
of the consumer will decline. This alterna-
tive policy produces a negative net surplus; 
it means that it is economically inefficient.  
Thenth, in the attempt to increase 
the production of grain/rice to achieve self-
sufficiency in rice, it should be better to 
focus more on the increasing of the produc-
tivity through the development of irrigation 
area and intensification area (the use of su-
perior seeds, integrated pest control and 
improve the quality of farm management). 
However, the increased production because 
of the intensification of development area 
and irrigated area can cause the welfare of 
the farmers to decrease, therefore the an-
ticipation to prevent the decrease of grain 
price is needed. In this regard the procure-
ment of grain from logistic agency needs to 
be effectively reinforced.  
Eleventh, in the attempt to respond 
to the increasing production of grain/rice, 
the policy of the floor price of grain is still 
necessarily needed. If the subsidy of the 
input price (fertilize price) is removed, it 
should be followed with the increasing of 
the output price (the grain price), at least 
the minimum percentage of its increasing is 
the same.  
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